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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: EXTENDED
INTERDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTS ON
INTERINDUSTRY COMPETITION AS
GROUNDS FOR CONDEMNATION *
PHILLUP AREEDA t AND DONALD TuRNER
I. INTRODUCTION
Some mergers will merely substitute a new owner for the ac-
quired firm, without thereby affecting the performance or conduct
of either of the two merging firms, or changing the market structure.
Other mergers will bring about each of these effects, even though
the merging parties neither compete directly nor deal vertically with
each other. A firm's improper or anticompetitive conduct, or its
rivals' fear of such conduct, can diminish the willingness and ability
of rivals to compete and of outsiders to enter the affected market.
Thus, such conduct can create or fortify barriers to new entry or
affect rivals' competitiveness and thereby become a factor in ap-
praising market structure and its effect upon competition. How-
ever, this Article does not address the ways in which a conglomerate
merger might facilitate such conduct as reciprocity or predatory
pricing. Nor do we consider the cost savings or other benefits that
might accrue to the merged firm as a result of the merger, thereby
"entrenching" the merged firm in its new market position. Here
we consider only the structural and performance implications that
may arise from a merger of firms not in a close horizontal or
vertical relationship.
The most frequently discussed structural change is the entry
via merger of a firm into a market that it might otherwise have
entered "at the grass roots." But this type of merger, which elimi-
nates a potential competitor, will not be discussed here. Instead,
this Article will examine two other ways in which conglomerate
mergers may alter market relationships. First, they may bring
multi-product firms into contact with each other in more than one
market; this wider exposure to competitive retaliation may create
an interdependence that discourages aggressive price cuts or other
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competitive responses that might otherwise be made. Second,
mergers across markets that are largely separate but whose products
are to some extent substitutable may have adverse price effects
similar to those caused by conventional horizontal mergers.
II. EXTENDED INTERDEPENDENCE
A. The Possibility
The primary concern with oligopoly is that rivals will mutually
forebear from vigorous price competition. Each of the large firms
dominating an oligopolistic market knows that its efforts at com-
petitive pricing will prove futile, in that rival firms will almost
certainly match any open price reduction before it has secured for
its proponent any large increase in market share. Ordinarily, no
large firm will initiate a price cut the principal effect of which
is to lower aggregate industry profits. For these reasons oligopolists
tend to engage in collective monopoly pricing.
Nevertheless, certain circumstances can induce one or more
firms in an oligopolistic market to behave aggressively, thus pro-
ducing substantial rivalry and even, at times, leading to "workably
competitive" results. For example, oligopolists with different costs,
market shares, current capacity utilizations, or demand assessments
may hold substantially different views about the efficacy of a price
cut. Thus, a particular oligopolist may regard such cuts as advan-
tageous, either as part of a temporary promotional campaign that
others hesitate to follow, or as a relatively permanent reflection of
that firm's lower costs. That is, an aggressive firm may be able
profitably to expand output even if every other firm in the market
follows its price reduction.
Thus, a particular oligopolist may occasionally make competi-
tive price moves, hoping thereby to increase its profits in that par-
ticular market despite probable countermoves by rivals in that
market. However, when the same oligopolist and his rivals confront
each other in several different markets, the effect may be further to
deter competition. Firm A, for example, may hesitate to reduce
price in market #1 (Ml) when it fears that rival B may retaliate
not only in that market but in market #2 (M2) as well. Before
making a rivalrous move in Ml, Firm A must calculate and balance
the long-term effects on its profits in both M1 and M2. The cumu-
lative effect of multiple retaliations in different markets may be
sufficiently threatening to deter Firm A, and each of its rivals, from
making any price cuts at all. In short, firms with similar interests
in different markets may recognize their interdependence across a
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broader front.- They will refrain from upsetting non-competitive
oligopolistic pricing in one market when they also inhabit a second
market in which they compete. 2 This effect, which we call "ex-
tended interdependence," may exist no matter how the firms came
to confront each other in more than one market. Of course, one
obvious cause of a multi-market confrontation is the conglomerate
merger.
Thus far the discussion has focused only on possibilities. To
say that conglomerate mergers may produce this anticompetitive
effect is not to say that they will do so. There are several minimum
conditions that must be met before this anticompetitive effect can
occur; even when these conditions are met, the resulting effect
would probably be minimal.
B. Necessary Conditions: General Incidence vs. Proof in
Particular Cases
Unless each of the three conditions described below is satisfied,
there can be no extension of interdependence or, if there is such an
extension, no significant anticompetitive effect from it. Whether
these conditions can actually be proved in particular cases 3 need
not be considered here, in view of our conclusion that conglomerate
mergers seldom produce the kind of extended interdependence that
is the focus of this inquiry.
1. The merged firm and at least one rival must confront each
other in two markets, each of which is somewhat oligopolistic in
performance but not rigidly so. There are several reasons for this
condition. First, unless the original market inhabited by the
acquired firm is oligopolistic, with significant departures from com-
petitive price and output performance, there can be no interde-
pendence to be extended.4 Second, if the acquiring firm does not
' See Newman, Strategic Groups and the Structure-Performance Relationship,
60 PEm. EcoN. & STvnsTics, 417-27 (1978).
2 The same possibility arises when one of two competing firms also buys a
product sold by the other. That situation will not be analyzed in detail here because
the relevant factors are so similar to those that bear upon reciprocity.
3 As a practical matter, it might be necessary to ignore some of these conditions
as unprovable in actual cases. However, if an unprovable necessary condition is not
likely to be fulfilled-that is, if it is both unprovable and improbable-there would
be no reason to prohibit the merger. Thus, even as to matters that are not readily
provable, we must understand all the prerequisites for significant anticompetitive
effects in order to gauge whether there is cause for concern and a need for preventive
efforts.
4 We shall use the convenient convention of looking for anticompetitive results
in the "first" market, which we attribute to the acquired firm. Of course, the harm
might be felt in the market of the acquiring firm. Nevertheless, the text will be
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inhabit some second, oligopolistic market, there can be no discre-
tionary behavior in the second market to affect behavior in the
first. Moreover, the second market must contain at least one other
firm that competes with the acquired firm in the first market; other-
wise, events in the second market cannot influence behavior in the
first.5 Finally, at least one of the markets must be less than rigidly
oligopolistic; if both were already rigid, they could not be made
significantly worse by the merger. Although extended interde-
pendence might impede any future relaxation of such oligopolistic
rigidity, its effect is so speculative to begin with that we would dis-
count it altogether in those situations in which the markets involved
are already rigidly noncompetitive.
In short, the problem is to identify the "moderate" oligopoly
that extended interdependence might significantly affect. This task
is complicated by the difficulty of proving that there is enough com-
petition to be worth saving from extended interdependence. The
greater the competition to be preserved, the less likely it is that the
market is the kind of relatively uncompetitive oligopoly in which
interdependence can exist. Certainly there may be noncompetitive
oligopolies that still retain some rivalrous vitality, which might be
impaired by extended interdependence. To identify such markets,
however, requires the use of the complex, detailed, and refined in-
quiries into structure and performance that are appropriate in an
occasional "shared monopoly" case 0 but that are wholly unmanage-
able in the. application of an anti-merger statute. Any effort to
solve the problem by formulating rules based on market-concen-
tration ratios-for example, four-firm ratios of fifty-five percent or
more, or eight-firm ratios of seventy-five percent or more-cannot
succeed because such ratios are a hopelessly crude means of isolat-
ing the markets in which extended interdependence might have
a significant effect, even assuming it would be a common
phenomenon.
2. The merged firm and at least one other two-market firm
must both be significant in both markets, and both markets must be
relatively important to both firms. Both markets must be im-
portant to both firms because events (or the fear of events) occur-
made shorter and clearer by speaking only of possible harmful effects in the first
market, which is that of the acquired firm.
5 One might worry about the future possibility that a single-market rival to the
acquired firm would later enter the second market, either by merger or by internal
expansion. To object to a merger on this ground, however, would approach
universal condemnation of conglomerate mergers.
6 See 3 P. AsmDA & D. TuRNER, AN=rsusr LAw 359-90 (1978).
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ring in a market that is relatively unimportant to a firm are not
likely to affect its profit-maximizing moves in a different, more im-
portant market. Moreover, unless the relevant two-market firms are
relatively significant competitive forces in each of the two markets,
their moves and forebearances will not determine the economic
performance of those markets. It is unlikely that a firm would re-
frain from a profitable, rivalrous move in the first market out of fear
of retaliation in a second market in which it is not a significant force.
The market in which a firm is relatively insignificant may also be
relatively unimportant to its overall fortunes. More important,
a significant firm in the second market would ordinarily base its
decisions there on the interests and prospective reactions of its
significant rivals in that market. When calculating its interests in
a market that is important to it, a significant firm cannot afford to
focus upon the reactions of a conglomerate rival in some other
market in which that rival is insignificant.
7
The concept of "significance" as used here is more readily in-
voked in principle than proved in fact. But it is a reasonable pre-
sumption that a firm with fifteen or twenty percent of a concen-
trated market is "significant." Furthermore, a somewhat smaller
firm that is growing rapidly or that has been a "disruptive" market
factor may also be "significant" as that term is used here.
3. To be deterred from a price cut in one market a firm must
be subject to sanctions in the second market. The situation in a
second market cannot deter two-market Firm A from a price cut or
other competitive move in the first market unless another two-
market company, Firm B, can subject the former to unfavorable
consequences in that second market. This could occur if Firm B
is unable to retaliate in M1 or simply finds retaliation cheaper in
M2. Firm A could suffer two sorts of unpleasant consequences in
the second market: its rival, Firm B, might be induced to exploit
a previously unexploited advantage, or might engage in predatory
or "spoiling" activity. Each of these possibilities will now be
examined.
a. Previously unexploited disadvantage in the second market.
It is possible that Firm A knows it has a previously unexploited
disadvantage in the second market that Firm B will exploit once A
7 It should be noted that the parallel significance discussed here can come
about through chance or through the parallel responses of different firms to common
economic forces. If, for example, two markets are related such that efficiencies can
be achieved by operating in both at a certain scale, one could expect to find several
diversified firms operating in both markets and at least at that scale.
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has made an aggressive competitive move in the first market. But
that situation can occur only if there is some reason for the stronger
Firm B previously to have sacrificed maximum profits in that mar-
ket in order to accommodate its weaker rival. There are two pos-
sible reasons why Firm B might have shown restraint. First, a com-
bination of ignorance and inertia might have kept it from perceiving
and exploiting its advantage in the second market over the
weaker firm, until the latter challenged its overall profits by ag-
gressive competition in the first market. The second possibility is
that Firm B might have had a reciprocal disadvantage in the first
or some other market in which it feared retaliation. These cir-
cumstances, though possible, seem far too unlikely to warrant a
general condemnation of conglomerate mergers among moderately
oligopolistic markets.
b. Spoiling the Second Market. Firm A may fear Firm B's re-
action in the second market, not because B is stronger there but
because it is weaker. If B is smaller than A in the second market,
B's retaliatory price reduction in that market would reduce A's
profits more than B's. That is, B might be able to "spoil" A's situa-
tion in the second market at relatively little cost to itself, and
thereby both punish and deter A from competition in the first
market. There may indeed be circumstances in which this scenario
could occur, but the preconditions for it would be quite severe.
These can be illustrated by an example.
After A has made aggressive moves in the first market, suppose
B retaliates by reducing its M2 price below the previously profitable
and satisfactory level. It is not important to specify either the level
of the price cut or its relationship to B's costs; the argument requires
only that A earn substantially less than it did before the price cut,
and that its loss of profits be much more severe than that of the
spoiler B. But the only way in which A, as well as other firms in
the second market, can be hurt substantially (and thus forced to
lower prices) is if B can both lower its prices and expand its sales
substantially; otherwise, customers cannot shift enough of their
patronage to B to force the other suppliers, including A, to cut their
prices. It is implausible, however, that B would build new capacity
solely for the purpose of spoiling; the expanded capacity would in-
crease B's volume of sales, on which it would earn, under the argu-
ment's assumptions, less than it otherwise could. Although such
expansion may be a profitable way for B to build sales and thus
obtain a higher market share and higher profits after prices return
to a satisfactory oligopoly level, this activity may not be termed
1979] 1087
1088 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"spoiling"; rather, it represents the seizure of a profitable oppor-
tunity undertaken independently of any effort to retaliate for events
in a different market. If the argument is that Firm B only chooses
to seize this profitable opportunity as a reaction to A's move in the
other market, the issue becomes that of the unexploited opportu-
nity, which has already been discussed.8
Other factors also restrain firms from retaliation through spoil-
ing. For example, Firm B may hesitate to punish A if it knows that
its actions may thereby destroy an oligopolistic consensus from
which it, as well as the other oligopolists of the market, has profited.
This is not to say that retaliation would not occur, or that Firm A
would always be unconcerned about reactions in the second market.
Even a small expansion of B's sales in the second market could, in
some cases, harm A or trigger a reaction by other firms which, in
the aggregate, have sufficient capacity to force A to lower price and
thus to suffer in the second market. Or perhaps a retaliatory motive
might induce Firm B to risk a price reduction that might prove
independently profitable or, if not, might be worth doing in order
to harm A. That is, B might otherwise have refrained from making
any price cut, due to the common concern among oligopolists that
such moves only reduce each rival's profits without affecting the
distribution of shares. But B might be willing to take that risk if
a retaliatory motive made it relatively indifferent to a profit
decline in the second market. That is, adding a retaliatory impulse
to the possibility that others might not respond could induce B to
reduce its price, which might lead to an increased share in that
market and perhaps to even greater profits if prices ultimately
stabilize at an attractive oligopoly level.9
s Of course, Firm B may already have substantial idle capacity in that market
or available to it; without having to build any new capacity, B can use its idle
capacity to hurt A. Again, however, if the idle capacity were large enough to permit
substantial expansion by B, it would be under heavy pressure to shade prices
anyway, and might even find expansion profitable; this, too, would be simply a case
of previously unexploited opportunity.
9 Our discussion of extended interdependence and mutual forbearance has
focused on the self-restraint exercised by Firm A in market MI because of its fear
that B will retaliate in M2. In that framework, we have suggested that unless M2
is quite important to A, that firm would not refrain from profit maximization in M1;
and A must have an unexploited disadvantage or otherwise be subject to unpleasant
consequences in M2 if his behavior in M1 is to be influenced.
There are no substantial changes in the analysis when one focuses on the case
in which Firms A and B have opposite roles in the two markets-for example, where
A dominates M1 while B dominates M2. Would A then cede price leadership in M2
to B "in return for" B's similar behavior in MI? This turns out to be a variation of
the situations discussed in the text: that is, can Firm A "spoil" the oligopolistic
consensus in M2, which is of great concern to Firm B, if B becomes too rivalrous
in Mi?
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These are possibilities, but they cannot be said to be probable
in all or most cases in which several firms confront each other in
several different markets. The more likely alternatives are that
spoiling will be ineffective or that the potential spoiler will regard
its gains as either too speculative or too ephemeral to justify up-
setting the oligopolistic consensus. If a firm really believes that its
aggressive moves will permit it to capture and hold a larger share
of the market, then its actions are not retaliatory in character. For
these reasons, it is unlikely that the attenuated threat posed by a
potential spoiler in M2 would be sufficient to deter Firm A from
pursuing its pricing policies in M1.
One further point should be noted. Whatever may happen
after the fact, a firm would rarely if ever plan a conglomerate ac-
quisition merely to foster extended interdependence. A firm with
a strong position in one market would have no incentive to acquire
a vulnerable firm in a second market if the principal effect of that
acquisition were to reduce its perceived ability to make profit-
maximizing moves in the fist market. Nor is there any reason for
a firm vulnerable in one market to acquire a strong firm in a second
market if the vulnerability reduced its felt ability to exploit the
strong firm's position. Although a firm strong in one market might
believe it advantageous to acquire a minor firm in a second market
to use as a "spoiler" to discipline a firm that was important in that
market and also a significant rival in the acquirer's market, we
doubt that this would often occur. Whatever anticompetitive ad-
vantages the acquiring firm gains by having available this distant
threat must be balanced against the cost of acquiring and maintain-
ing a minor firm solely for the purpose of possible use as a "spoiler."
On balance, that benefit seems highly speculative.
C. Effect on Innovations
Up to this point, this Article has focused solely upon the pos-
sible effect of extended interdependence in deterring price com-
petition; other modes of competition have not been considered. It
has been suggested that a substantial deterrent to price competition
may occur, if at all, only if the merger meets certain quite restrictive
conditions. Yet even when those conditions are met, there is no
reason to believe that the merger will produce any significant ad-
verse effect on competition in innovations.
Although oligopoly may deter price competition, it seldom, if
ever, diminishes technological or other innovational competition.
Unlike a price cut, an innovation, particularly if patentable or con-
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cealable, cannot be quickly matched. Thus an innovating firm can
often obtain, for itself alone, substantial rewards from its innova-
tions. Innovative effort is also stimulated by the fear of substantial
loss from the innovations of rivals. In short, insofar as innovational
competition is concerned, there is much less "interdependence"
among the firms within an oligopolistic market. Thus, there is no
reason to fear the effects of extended interdependence upon inno-
vational rivalry, because in this case there is nothing to be extended.
It is quite implausible that parallel conglomerate presence in
several markets would have any additional deterrent effect upon
innovation. Clearly this is true with respect to conglomerates sell-
ing the same product in separate geographic markets. Product im-
provements or cost reductions resulting from innovation give the
innovating firm an advantage in all its markets; thus, it need not
fear retaliation in its weaker areas. Even those conglomerates en-
gaged in diverse product markets are not likely to diminish their
innovational efforts and thus risk market displacement by innovat-
ing rivals, because they fear that discovery and exploitation of a
successful innovation in one product market might provoke retalia-
tion in another.
D. Intermarket and Intramarket Interdependence Compared
Extended interdependence cannot be an important constraint
on behavior within one of two markets unless the minimum condi-
tions described above are met. However, even if the facts of a
particular merger satisfy all three conditions, it does not necessarily
follow that that merger will produce any unacceptable, anticompeti-
tive effects. Two key points should be stressed. First, the anti-
competitive effects of oligopolistic interdependence within a single
market are uncertain: both oligopoly theory and the empirical evi-
dence offered to support it remain the subjects of lively dispute.1 0
Second, the effects of interdependence will be even less noticeable,
and therefore less verifiable, when measured across two markets
rather than in one. Indeed, oligopoly theory and the empirical evi-
dence substantiating it are the Rock of Gibraltar as compared to the
speculative theory of interdependence across market lines. The
empirical evidence advanced so far to substantiate any adverse effects
of extended interdependence has been characterized as ranging from
sketchy 1 to nonexistent.'
2
10 See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuRnE~r, ANTITRUST LAw 272-79 (1978).
11 See F. ScHmE, husTnmu MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 279-80 (1970).
12See P. SEumum, MERGERS 310 (1975).
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E. How Significant: Conclusions, Presumptions,
and Burdens of Proof
The preceding discussion does not deny (1) that mutual for-
bearance or extended interdependence might occur and might re-
duce competition that would otherwise occur; (2) that the likelihood
of such results occurring may increase with the number of signifi-
cant multi-market firms, and; (3) that conglomerate mergers thereby
increase the possibility of anticompetitive results in the economy.
But these propositions represent abstract "possibilities," which occur
at most infrequently, and with dubious effect. Moreover, once in
the realm of speculation, one must also admit the possibility that
an oligopolist's rivalrous step in one market might trigger a series
of highly rivalrous reactions in each of the other markets in which
he and his rivals intersect; the net result may be to increase com-
petition in many markets. Competition might also increase if an
oligopolist's ability to retaliate in one market increases his willing-
ness to make a competitive move in a different market. In short,
one who wishes to oppose conglomerate mergers on the ground that
they produce extended interdependence must do more than state
that anticompetitive results are possible. To be convincing, he
must show that such results are likely to occur in a particular con-
glomerate merger, in many such mergers, or in the preponderance
of conglomerate mergers.
We can state with reasonable confidence these three conclusions.
First, because the incidence and importance of extended interde-
pendence are so doubtful, the mere assertion that mutual forbear-
ance is a possible consequence of conglomerate mergers does not
provide sufficient justification for condemning these mergers. Sec-
ond, in order successfully to raise the objection of extended inter-
dependence, a plaintiff seeking to block a merger must first estab-
lish that the minimum conditions described above have been met.
Third, the difficulties of proof are so severe, and administrable
presumptions so lacking in foundation, that it would probably be
wiser for courts and litigants to ignore the issue of extended inter-
dependence entirely.
III. MERGERS AFFECTING "INTERINDUSTRY" COMPETITION
A. The Problem Defined
We have just analyzed the likelihood that a series of conglom-
erate mergers across market lines might discourage competition in
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one or more markets by increasing the opportunities for retaliation.
For this possibility to exist, it is not necessary that the several
products involved compete with each other; that is, retaliatory
moves might be made in product or geographic markets wholly dis-
tinct from the one in which a price cut or other competitive move
was initiated.
We will now examine whether additional anticompetitive
effects occur whenever a firm participates in two or more product
or geographic markets that are not wholly separate-that is, when
there is some competition between those markets but not enough to
warrant the conclusion that they are parts of the same market for
purposes of section 2 of the Sherman Act, or for horizontal merger
purposes. Because conglomerate acquisitions in partially compet-
ing markets reduce the aggregate number of competing firms, it is
possible to argue that parallel cross-ownership by many firms causes
the same kind of adverse effects that usually accompany horizontal
mergers. In brief, there are two possible reasons for this anticom-
petitive effect. First, when a firm with a large share of each of two
partially competing markets-for example, products A and B-re-
duces the price on one of them (A), the increased profits it makes
in that market are likely to be partially offset by the loss in sales of
product B, which occurs as some of its customers switch from B
to A. The firm is thus less likely to reduce price than if it were
in one market only.
There is a second, related possibility. Assume, for example,
that there are only five A firms and five B firms. If each of the A
firms merges with one of the B firms, the reduction in number
(from a total of ten firms to only five) may facilitate cooperative,
non-competitive pricing; because there are fewer firms, their inter-
dependence will be clearer, and tacit price coordination easier. The
result may be increases in the prices of A, of B, or of both.
However, as was the case with extended interdependence, the
likelihood and magnitude of these adverse effects (1) are consider-
ably less than in the case of conventional horizontal mergers; (2) de-
pend upon several highly restrictive conditions; (3) probably do not
extend to competition in innovations; and (4) are sufficiently remote
that they should probably be disregarded except in extreme cases.
The likelihood and magnitude of any possible anticompetitive effect
can increase under certain circumstances. These include cases in
which the products involved are "close" substitutes; the number of
significant sellers of these products, or of equally close substitutes, is
very small; or the merging firms are "leading" firms in their respec-
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tive markets. All of these circumstances, in conjunction, might con-
stitute the "extreme" case that warrants judicial intervention.
Each of these points will be examined in detail below. For
the sake of simplicity, we will focus only upon the case of two
partially competing products, rather than that of partially over-
lapping geographic markets; the analysis in both instances, however,
is the same. Moreover, as will later be shown, the presence of
adverse effects becomes less likely as the number of overlapping
markets increases.
B. Interindustry and Horizontal Mergers Compared;
Market Definition
In essence, "interindustry competition" reflects the fact that
buyers make a heterogeneous evaluation of products with differing
characteristics: some buyers do not consider the products as substi-
tutes at all; others consider them substitutes, but at differing rela-
tive prices. Whether the products should be included in the same
market partially depends on whether the number of buyers who
consider them to be highly substitutable is sufficient to keep their
price movements closely related. Poorly correlated price move-
ments indicate that the producers of Product A can exert only a
slight influence on the price of B; they do not affect B's prices as
much as do firms actually producing B, and they could not prevent
the non-competitive pricing of B if B's market became a well-
functioning oligopoly. Consequently, the market for testing a
merger of two B producers is correctly defined to include the out-
put of that product only.
To be sure, the effects of a merger of an A producer with a B
producer will approach those of a standard horizontal merger as the
two products approach perfect substitution. Nevertheless, as long
as the two products would normally be assigned to separate markets,
two conclusions can be drawn. First, the competitive loss from a
merger of two A (or B) producers presumptively exceeds that from
a comparably sized merger of an A and a B producer. For example,
the anticompetitive effect of a merger between two of four equiva-
lent firms operating in one market, or between two of eight such
firms, is necessarily greater than that of a merger between two firms
from two related markets, each of which has four equivalent firms.
Second, iii evaluating a merger between an A and a B producer, it
would be delusive to abandon correct market definition principles,
define the market as A plus B, and assess the merger by tallying the
merging firms' shares of aggregate A and B output.
1979]
1094 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Interindustry mergers must be analyzed in terms of the mini-
mum conditions for anticompetitive effects that are both likely and
substantial. Three such conditions will be identified and discussed
below. Thereafter, we will examine the effect of interindustry
mergers on innovation.
1. Both markets must be non-competitive. If one or both of
the products of the conglomerate firm are sold in a highly competi-
tive market, cross-market ownership can create no anticompetitive
price effects. A competitive market dictates the prices charged by
its firms. That those firms also sell one or more other, related
products in a different market does not alter the structure of the
competitive market, or the behavior of any of the firms operating in
it. Because activities in the competitive market are unaffected by
events occurring elsewhere, a monopolist or oligopolist in a second
market would have no incentive to alter its behavior in that second
market in an attempt to influence the competitive market.
Consider the case of a major oil producer's acquisition of a
significant coal producer. Ignore any geographical peculiarities or
the presence of highly specialized products, and assume that coal
production generally occurs in a highly competitive market. Be-
cause this merger between one coal and one oil company does not
affect the structure of either industry, it does not reduce inter-
product rivalry in price or marketing. Because the coal industry is
competitively structured, no firm has discretionary power over coal
prices. It does not matter if the merged firm is a monopolist or an
oligopolist in the production of oil. The market will still deter-
mine its coal prices. The firm's control over oil gives it no addi-
tional power over the sale of coal. Consequently, its oil decisions
must still be made on the same basis as before the merger.
2. The two-market firm must be able to affect price in both
markets. Even if both partially related markets are significantly
non-competitive, cross-market ownership is not likely to have a sub-
stantial, adverse price effect unless the two-product firm has substan-
tial power to affect price in both markets. But even a two-market
firm with sufficient power would seldom have the incentive to act
differently than would a single-market firm.
A two-market firm not dominant in one of its markets would
not raise its price in either market above the profit-maximizing
level for that market alone; if it tried to do so, its independent
rivals in that market, who are concerned only with their profits
there, would refuse to follow the price increase. As a result, the
two-market firm's increase could not be sustained.
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If dominant in one of the markets, the two-market firm could
sustain a price increase there for the purpose of deflecting sales to
the second market. But unless it was dominant in the second
market as well, the firm would seldom make such a move, for the
primary beneficiaries would be the independent firms in the second
market. Consequently, unless a two-market firm dominates both
markets, cross-market ownership probably will not cause distortions
in either market.
To be sure, a firm need not be dominant in order to affect
price. A non-dominant but significant firm can influence the be-
havior of its rivals. A price reduction by a firm with, for example,
a twenty percent market share is likely to be imitated by its rivals.
Although the non-dominant firm cannot force others to follow its
price increases, it might refrain from leading a price decrease in
one market in order to profit in a different one. However, such
moves could only be temporary-the non-dominant firm could not
effectively influence prices in the first market over a long period of
time unless it had a substantial and permanent cost advantage over
its rivals there. It would be rare indeed, however, for a firm to
refrain from exploiting such an advantage in its first market in
order to avoid diverting sales away from a second, related market;
such reticence would be almost inconceivable unless the firm were
dominant in that second market.
Thus, cross-market ownership would probably have no adverse
price effects in either market unless the two-market firm is dominant
in at least one, and more likely both, of the markets.
3. Two-product firms collectively dominating both markets must
occupy roughly symmetrical positions in both. We next consider
whether several two-product firms, acting collectively, can suppress
competition in one market in order to enhance profit in the other
market.13 It is instructive to compare such firms with the situation
of a monopolist who controls two related products, A and B. The
monopolist would not seek to maximize profits on A alone or on B
alone, but instead would set that pair of prices that maximized his
overall profits.14
13 The fact that one cross-market merger has occurred does not imply that other
cross-market mergers will occur; nor does legal permission for one merger necessarily
imply permission for successive mergers. Nevertheless, we are discussing the case
that might seem most threatening to competition: parallel cross-market mergers that
reduce substantially the number of independent decisionmakers in the two markets.
14 As compared with the situation in which each of two independent monopolists
controls one of two markets, a monopolist controlling both markets will charge
higher prices when the two products are substitutes (such as oil and coal) but lower
prices when the two products are complements (such as auto frames and auto
motors). See, e.g., 3 P. AnmanA & D. Tuuma_, supra note 6, at 200-04.
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By contrast, two or more two-product firms operating in the
same two markets would not react that way unless each had similar
interests in both markets. For example, a firm with a predominant
interest in the B market would not want to sacrifice profits there in
favor of greater profits in the A market where its interest was sub-
stantially smaller.15 No rational firm would surrender profit in one
market unless its incremental gain in the other market was at least
as great. Thus, even if express collusion were permitted, several
two-product firms without symmetrical interests in the two markets
would have difficulty agreeing on a mutually satisfactory pair of
prices, unless they could agree on a pooling and division of profits.
In the absence of express collusion, coordination among firms
with different interests is even less likely. Moreover, as the num-
ber of product markets increases, so too does the likelihood that the
firms will have divergent interests; thus, the difficulties of coordina-
tion multiply. In short, after cross-market mergers have been made,
interindustry competition may continue more or less as before.
It should be emphasized that the condition described here-
that each firm have symmetrical interests in each market-is not
categorically "necessary" to produce anticompetitive effects. Even
two conglomerates with diverse interests may at times reluctantly
forego competition and acquiesce in price stability as the lesser of
evils. This is especially true when only a few firms control both
markets. Moreover, it is possible that pre-merger, interproduct
competition could be sufficient to keep the prices of both products
below profit-maximizing levels; thus, after the merger, the merged
firms would have convergent interests in raising prices, a move that
cross-market ownership could facilitate. As will become evident,
neither of these points is compelling. There are several reasons for
this conclusion.
First, that firms have been able to accommodate some of their
diverse interests in a single market does not necessarily mean that
they could accommodate significant diversities between different
markets. Nor is it clear that such an accommodation would produce
significantly higher prices.
Second, in the unusual event that the firms in each of two
markets perceive their interests as sufficiently similar to raise both
prices, their desire or ability to do so will not depend upon the
presence or absence of cross-market ownership. To the extent that
"cross-market ownership" implies that there will be very few de-
15 A firm may prefer one product over another because in the former market it
has greater sales, greater excess capacity, lower relative costs, or some other com-
petitive advantage.
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cisionmakers, it does tend to facilitate cooperative price setting.
Parallel mergers among the five firms in each of two related markets,
for example, could increase the likelihood of tacit price coordination
affecting both markets. However, as long as there are many decision-
makers, the fact that some produce partially substitutable products
in separate but overlapping markets is irrelevant to price deter-
mination.
Third, interproduct competition would not often be decisive
in keeping prices below profit-maximizing levels unless it were mani-
fested in a fairly high correlation in the products' price changes-in
short, unless the two products are so closely competitive that they
should be treated as parts of the same market. If that were the
case, however, the issue would involve horizontal rather than con-
glomerate merger. The absence of price correlation indicates that
if prices have been kept below profit-maximizing levels, intra-
industry, not interindustry competition is responsible; interindustry
mergers cannot change that result. Of course, this is a matter of
degree. Markets can be separate and yet close enough to limit each
other, such that important competition would be lost if the firms
in those two markets could effectively but tacitly coordinate prices.
Fourth, joint profit maximization, although otherwise possible,
may be impeded by the availability of other close substitutes. Sup-
pose, for example, that cans and bottles are properly placed in
separate markets, but that there is enough interindustry competition
between them to justify concern (for all of the reasons already dis-
cussed above) over a can firm's merger with a bottle firm, and
especially with parallel mergers among all of the major can and
bottle firms. The resulting threat to competition, if any, would be
reduced if another substance, such as plastic or cardboard, were
available for use as a substitute for cans and bottles. Consider again
the prospective behavior of a monopolist who controls both the can
and bottle markets. If plastic were unavailable or unusable as a
substitute, the monopolist's control over both cans and bottles could
permit it to set a higher price for each than that set by one that
controlled only one market and was faced with perfect competition
in the other. But if plastic is as good a substitute for cans as are
bottles,' G then a monopolist who controls the can market would not
increase its ability to raise can prices merely by acquiring a
monopoly in the bottle market. Just as its can price previously was
10 This assumption does not mean that bottles and plastic are in the same
market. Plastic might substitute equally for bottles as an alternative to cans without
being a complete enough substitute for bottles in all bottle uses to be considered in
the same market as bottles.
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constrained by competition from bottles, it remains equally limited
by competition from plastic. Unfortunately, this point is not readily
translated into an operational rule. Just as the degree of "closeness"
between cans and bottles eludes precise specification once they are
assigned to separate markets, so also does the closeness of plastic
containers to cans and bottles. However, it would certainly be in-
consistent for one to ignore the imperfect plastic substitutes while
making the imperfect substitutability of cans and bottles determina-
tive. Perhaps all one can require is a rule of consistency: If a
plaintiff attempting to block a cross-market merger offers evidence
concerning the substitutability of cans and bottles, then the defend-
ant also should be allowed to use similar kinds of evidence to show
that other products are equally substitutable.
Of course, merely identifying a third product does not neces-
sarily eliminate the problem addressed here. Suppose, for example,
that the single can producer merges with the single bottle firm. If
there is only one producer of plastic containers and no other sub-
stitute products are available, the aggregate number of producers
may still be small enough to permit tacit price coordination that
elevates the price of all three products. On the other hand, if there
are five producers of each of the three products, parallel mergers
among the can and bottle firms would still leave ten decisionmakers.
In light of the many difficulties of interproduct coordination, this
number is probably enough to ensure independent pricing. Indeed,
even if bottles and cans were completely substitutable, ten producers
would be enough, since that number of competitors within a single
market usually is sufficient to protect competition.
Several conclusions may be drawn. First, tacit price coordina-
tion is much more difficult to achieve across two interrelated markets
than it is in a single market. Second, such coordination is most
likely when both markets are collectively dominated by very few
firms, each of which has symmetrical interests in both markets.
The symmetrical interests relevant here concern profitmaking op-
portunities, which are not necessarily a function of market shares
alone. Proving the existence of such symmetry in particular cases
may not be an easy matter. Third, symmetry is not a logically
"necessary" condition to produce adverse effects. It may be sufficient
if each two-market firm believes it would not suffer substantially
by setting prices close to those that would be set by a two-market
monopolist. As a practical matter, however, this condition also
would be difficult to prove in particular cases. Fourth, if the second
or third point is satisfied-or if both points are ignored for reasons
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of administrative convenience-tacit price coordination between two
close but separate markets could nevertheless be achieved merely
because the number of two-market firms collectively dominating
those markets is very small. Fifth, in order to apply the last point,
one could include two subordinate rules of thumb. First of all, in
judging the effect of a merger on each of two interrelated markets,
one may assume that other equivalent-sized firms (or smaller ones)
would also want to merge, and that if one such merger were legal,
all other similar ones would also be.17 This assumption has the
virtue of allowing all similarly situated firms to achieve the same
economies, if there are any, realized by the initially merging firms.
The other rule of thumb is that one may not ignore the existence of
additional independent decisionmakers in other markets that are as
closely related to either of the merging firms' two markets as the
latter are to each other.
It is not easy to convert these conclusions into legal presump-
tions, but if the symmetry issue may be ignored, the following pre-
sumptions may be reasonable, at least as an initial formulation.
The suggested magnitudes are consistent with those that we would
apply to horizontal mergers, with an adjustment made for the diffi-
culties of intermarket coordination. A merger between two firms
in different markets may be presumed unlawful when all of the
following conditions obtain:
(1) The two products are "close" substitutes for each other.
"Closeness" need not be so clearly demonstrated as long as
it is shown to be increasing; if decreasing, the degree of
closeness must be clearly demonstrated.
(2) Each market is highly concentrated, as indicated by a four-
firm concentration ratio of ninety percent or more, or a
two-firm concentration ratio of seventy percent or more.
(3) Each merging firm is "substantial," in that it accounts for
at least fifteen percent of its market and is among the four
largest firms in its market.
(4) There is no other market whose product is an equally close
substitute. Or, if there is such a market, it is also highly
concentrated, and the aggregate number of substantial
firms in the three markets in question is eight or less.
17 This proposition is doubtful even for horizontal mergers; it is based largely
upon considerations of administrability.
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C. Effects on Innovation
Whatever effects they may have on price competition, inter-
industry mergers, even among dominant firms, probably have no
significant adverse effects upon innovation. The basic reasons for
this conclusion are the same as those already set forth in the dis-
cussion of extended interdependence.
In United States v. Continental Can Co.s8 the Supreme Court
concluded that "it would make little sense" 19 for the can division
of a conglomerate firm to engage in innovating activity that, if suc-
cessful, would take sales from the bottle division, while the latter
was engaged in innovating activity that, if successful, would take
sales from the former. In fact, the conglomerate is likely to do just
that. As long as the conglomerate does not monopolize either
market, its gains from successful innovation in one product will
almost certainly exceed any losses caused to the other, and successful
innovations by rivals in either product will impose sales losses on
both of its products.
Continental Can provides the framework for a hypothetical
example that illustrates that the incentive to innovate probably
survives intermarket mergers. To the extent that bottles do not
compete with cans-which is true for most of their uses-cost-reduc-
ing or product-improving innovations on bottles have no effect on
can sales. To the extent that the two products do compete, inno-
vations on bottles will reduce can sales no matter who introduces
them; obviously, Continental will be much better off if it, rather
than its rivals, makes these innovations. Suppose, for example, that
Continental's innovations secured an additional $100 million in
bottle sales, $20 million of which was at the expense of the can
industry. Assume that, as one of several can producers, Continental
would lose only one-fourth of all can sales lost, that is, $5 million.
Thus, its net gain would be $95 million.
To be sure, if Continental produced only bottles, it would have
gained $100 million rather than $95 million. Moreover, the dif-
ference could be much larger with a different set of assumptions.
But even this modest difference illustrates the point that the bottle
innovator who also sells cans makes less from its innovation than
it would have made had it been involved only in the bottle in-
dustry. If its investment in bottle innovation could have been
18378 U.S. 441 (1964).
19 Id. 465. This comment actually referred to competing promotional efforts.
It was made during the course of the Court's rejection of the district court's finding
that Continental would probably continue to innovate in both the bottle and can
industries.
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equally successful (that is, if it could have yielded a $100-million
gain) in some other endeavor that carried an offsetting loss of less
than $5 million, then the fact of its involvement in the can market
would have induced it to channel its innovative efforts into some
area other than the bottle industry. In short, the merged can-bottle
firm would innovate less in bottles than would a firm producing
only bottles. Accordingly, the interindustry merger could reduce
innovation.
Three factors, however, severely undercut the force of the last
argument. First, it may be far more difficult in practice than it is
in a hypothetical for a firm to fine-tune its innovative strategy.
Indeed, it is probably impossible for a firm correctly to perceive and
gauge all the variables necessary to make these calculations. Second,
it is by no means certain that the firm has more lucrative innova-
tional opportunities available in fields unrelated to the bottle in-
dustry. Third, by foregoing its innovational opportunities in the
bottle industry, the merged firm takes the risk that its rivals will
make such innovations. If they do, the merged firm will lose not
only the $5 million in can sales, but also a large volume of bottle
sales. That is, the risk of not innovating must also influence the
research and development calculus of the two-market firm. This
last risk could more than offset any disincentive to innovate, unless
one makes the doubtful assumption that parallel mergers of other
can and bottle firms would lead all (or most) of them to reduce
their innovative efforts with respect to both products.
As long as some can and bottle firms operate in only one market,
their efforts to innovate will proceed unabated by the possibility
that, if successful, they would cause losses in the sale of other
products by other firms. The fact that one merger is permitted
does not mean that other, single-product firms would also want to
merge. But let us assume that they want to do so, and that permis-
sion for one merger implies permission for others as well. Let us
also assume that, after these mergers have been completed, we end
up with "relatively few" firms, each of which operates in both
markets.2 0 Even so, it seems reasonable to suppose that incentives
2OAt the conference at which this paper was presented, Professor Joseph
Brodley correctly pointed out that if this development reduces price competition and
thus leads to reduced output, that result alone might reduce the gains from some
innovations and thus could reduce the incentive for innovative activity. For example,
the gain from a cost-reducing innovation would decrease as a firm's output decreases.
Nevertheless, the cost saving produced by innovation might enable the innovator to
increase his market share and to profit substantially, even if the price level exceeds
the competitive level and industry output is below that which a competitive
industry would produce.
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to innovate will continue. Tacit collusion on innovation is ex-
tremely rare, if not entirely absent, even in those situations that
encourage price coordination among oligopolists. Such collusion is
seldom found within a single market and is equally rare when two
markets are involved. To be sure, each two-market firm might
conclude that its gains from an innovation in one product would
be reduced by the diversion of its own sales of the other product.
Nevertheless, the potential for substantial gains at the expense of
one's rivals would remain. In conclusion, we do not contend that
an interindustry merger could never significantly impair innovation,
but that the risk of impairment is modest in view of the incentives
for non-price competition existing even within a single oligopolistic
market.
21
D. Conclusion
Interindustry mergers may have substantial anticompetitive ef-
fects only when several conditions obtain: (1) both markets must be
significantly non-competitive; (2) the resulting two-market firms
created by the merger must be able to dominate price determination
in both markets; and (3) the dominant firms' respective interests in
the two markets must be similar. Even when these conditions have
been met, however, cooperative solutions still may be impeded by
the additional complexities of coordinating prices over two or more
partially related markets whose precise interrelationships are diffi-
cult to determine. And, of course, the existence of one or more
other partially competing products to which conglomerate owner-
ship does not extend may further limit any adverse effects.
There is considerably less reason to prevent interindustry
mergers than there is to attack horizontal mergers that create
oligopoly. The effect of interindustry mergers is analogous, and
possibly equivalent, to that of those horizontal mergers that some-
what increase concentration in an already highly concentrated
market. There is, therefore, some basis for prohibiting interindustry
mergers among dominant firms, or for using the possibility of anti-
competitive consequences as an additional reason for prohibition
when the merging firms are part of a small group of likely entrants
into each other's markets.
2 1 We reach this conclusion wholly apart from (1) the fact that many con-
gRomerates leave research and development decisions to their various product
divisions organized as "profit centers"; and (2) the possibility that the conglomerate
may well conclude, for the reasons noted in the text, or for other reasons, that it
would benefit from intracompany innovating competition.
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However, as was the case with the prerequisites for "extended
interdependence," it is difficult to demonstrate when these condi-
tions have been met. This problem could be moderated by the use
of presumptions. One could, for example, adopt the presumptions
earlier set forth. Yet one might remain skeptical; presumptions
will not simplify the matter if rebutting economic evidence is al-
lowed. On the other hand, conclusive presumptions could cover far
too much. That result might not be cause for great concern if such
mergers never benefited the economy, but they sometimes do.
